Updating democracy studies: outline of a research program

Technologies carry politics since they embed values. It is therefore surprising that mainstream political and legal theory have taken the issue so lightly. Compared to what has been going on over the past few decades in the other branches of practical thought, namely ethics, economics and the law, political theory lags behind. Yet the current emphasis on Internet politics that polarizes the apologists holding the web to overcome the one-to-many architecture of opinion-building in traditional representative democracy, and the critics that warn cyber-optimism entails authoritarian technocracy has acted as a wake up call. This paper sets the problem – “What is it about ICTs, as opposed to previous technical devices, that impact on politics and determine uncertainty about democratic matters?” – into the broad context of practical philosophy, by offering a conceptual map of clusters of micro-problems and concrete examples relating to “e-democracy”. The point is to highlight when and why the hyphen of e-democracy has a conjunctive or a disjunctive function, in respect to stocktaking from past experiences and settled democratic theories. My claim is that there is considerable scope to analyse how and why online politics fails or succeeds. The field needs both further empirical and theoretical work

Sorting out modern constitutional provisions on emergency. A taxonomic framework

n/

Sodobna razprava o državljanstvu

“Citizenship is the right to have rights” was famously claimed by Hannah Arendt. The case of the Slovenian erased sheds new light on this assumption that was supposedly put to rest after World War II. We lack a comprehensive paradigm for grasping what citizenship means today in, and for, our societies. My thesis is that there are currently three ways to understand the notion. These different views tend to merge and overlap in today’s debate, furthering misunderstandings. I will account for the different conceptions of citizenship by looking at the opposite of citizenry. The political model holds the subject (sujet) in opposition to the citizen (citoyen), entailing problems related to the democratic quality of institutions. Law and jurisprudence look at citizenship by trying to limit the numerous hard cases arising in a world of migration where the opposite of the citizen is the alien and the stateless. While in social science citizenship is the opposite of exclusion and represents social membership, my aim is therefore to distinguish and clear out these three different semantic areas. This essay is presented in four sections: First, I briefly recall the case of the erased. The second section focuses on discourse analysis so as to enucleate the three different meanings of citizenship that we find in the current debate according to the prevailing disciplinary fields: political, legal and social sciences. Thirdly, attention will be directed to the composition of the different semantic areas that are connected to the term citizenship. I suggest that we are now dealing with a threefold notion. Finally, I will point to an array of questions that citizenship raises in today’s complex society and try to show how this tri-partition of the meaning of “citizenship” can be a useful device for decision makers so as to design as consistent policies as possible.Pojem »državljanstvo« ima danes mnogo širši pomen, kot ga je imelo še pred nekaj desetletji. V sodobni razpravi obstajajo trije načini rabe tega pojma – politični, pravni in sociološki, vendar se pomeni prepogosto stapljajo, tudi prekrivajo, nerazumevanje pa se zato poglablja. Vsak od treh načinov rabe izriše drugo osnovno dvopomenskost. Enkrat se nasproti državljanu postavlja podanika, drugič tujca, tretjič spet izključenega. V tej razpravi skušam te pomene jasno razčleniti. Zraven se oslonim na primer slovenskih izbrisanih, opozorim pa tudi na določena vprašanja, povezana z državljanstvom, ki v današnji evropski družbi še vedno ostajajo odprta

La legislación en Hägerström

The relationship between law and politics is one of the most debated topics in legal theory. There is no consensus on the range and scope of the political and the legal element in law. Legislation or lawmaking is conceptually ambiguous because it indicates the law which has been promulgated, and therefore the primary object of many modern theories of law, but also the process of making it, that many theories of law usually locate outside the scope of jurisprudence and more specifically in the realm of politics. The first section sets the problem of legislation by distinguishing a number of different problems that often appear indistinctly under this label. Standpoints can be viewed according to a spectrum stretching from legal theories holding politics to essentially permeate the law to those claiming the opposite. The aim is to situate Hägerström’s view on law-making along this spectrum. My claim is that Scandinavian realism holds middleground in that ideological constructs structurally affect the law yet legal normativity cannot be reduced to the will of de facto holders of power: law cannot be reduced to any idea of will, including that of the majority or of the people. To substantiate this claim the article investigates Hägerström’s view on the foundation of a new constitution pursuant to a political revolution, the ultimate touchstone for maintaining the (in)distinctiveness of law and politics. His bottom line is that the problem cannot be explained in terms of discovery of public interest, because of his non-cognitivist approach. But it cannot be explained in terms of decision-making either. Law-making here amounts to access and control of technical procedures grounded in a form of faith, or in his own terms “ideas governing men’s minds”.La relación entre derecho y política es uno de los temas más debatidos en la teoría del derecho. No hay un consenso sobre el alcance y extensión del elemento político y del elemento jurídico en el derecho. Legislación es un concepto ambiguo porque designa a la ley que ha sido promulgada, y, por tanto, el objeto primario de muchas teorías jurídicas modernas; pero también el proceso de crearla, el cual muchas teorías del derecho, por lo general, colocan fuera del ámbito de la teoría del derecho y, de modo más específico, en la esfera política. La primera sección plantea el problema de la legislación al distinguir un número de diferentes problemas que a menudo aparecen indistintamente bajo esta etiqueta. Los distintos puntos de vista pueden mirarse de acuerdo con un espectro que va desde teorías jurídicas que sostienen que la política permea la ley de manera esencial, hasta aquellas que sostienen lo contrario. El objetivo es situar en este espectro la perspectiva de Hägerström acerca de la legislación. Mi postura es que el realismo escandinavo se mantiene en un punto medio entre la idea de que las construcciones ideológicas afectan al derecho y aquella en que la normatividad jurídica no puede reducirse a la voluntad de quienes, de facto, detentan el poder; así, el derecho no puede reducirse a ninguna idea de “voluntad” o “intención”, incluyendo a aquellas de la mayoría o el pueblo. Para fundamentar este argumento, este artículo investiga la perspectiva de Hägerström acerca del establecimiento de una nueva constitución a través de una revolución política, última piedra de toque para mantener la (in)distintividad de la ley y la política. Su conclusión es que el problema no se puede explicar en términos del descubrimiento del interés público, debido a su enfoque nocognitivista; pero este tampoco puede ser explicado en términos de la toma de decisiones. Aquí legislar equivale al acceso y control de procedimientos técnicos basados en una forma de fe, o en sus términos propios, “ideas que gobiernan las mentes de los hombres”

Chi deve essere cittadino? La teoria della cittadinanza nella Politica di Aristotele

In this paper, I argue that Aristotle was the first and only philosopher to have developed what may be called a general theory of citizenship. This theory is useful in order to assess the coherence and consistency of policies regulating the access to the polity that include most notably citizenship policy, but also migration policies regulating prior segments of the route to naturalisation. The theory is based on the thesis of correlation, according to which access to status civitatis is a variable of the content of the status. There is, in other words, a relationship between who is a citizen (i.e. the extension of citizenship) and what a citizen is (i.e. the intension of citizenship). I think this relationship is best described as a functional correlation, even if these are not the Aristotelian terms. Function here appears in its mathematical meaning. The correlation is functional, in the sense that the criteria regulating acquisition and loss of the status must fit the entitlements or legal positions that citizenship gives access to. If the criteria for acquisition and loss are not aligned with the legal positions associated with citizenship, the status becomes an arbitrary tool of social closure. This theory, I argue, focuses on the functional dependence between legal positions (rights and/or obligations that constitute the content of status civitatis) and the criteria for acquisition and loss of the status (which gives the form to the status). To answer the question «who should be a citizen?» it is necessary to ask whether it is reasonable that a certain personal feature is deemed necessary and/or sufficient to confer the status which gives access to a given set of entitlements. If the answer is positive, the feature constitutes a reason for conferring citizenship; otherwise, it does not. For Aristotle, the person who can exercise the rights and fulfil the duties of citizenship is entitled to the status. Which characteristics are relevant (and which should be reasonably required) will depend on the rights and duties related to a specific citizenship. The latter are not the same everywhere because they depend on the constitutional identity of the state. Where the state is democratic, citizenship rights include participating in popular juries, but not so elsewhere. The criteria for acquisition and loss of citizenship also change, depending on the constitutional identity of the state

Cittadini e no

The theme of “citizenship” has become very topical once again. Who should be considered a citizen? What does it mean to be a citizen? What are the mechanisms regulating inclusion and exclusion from citizenship? How can these mechanisms be justified and criticized? Using a multidisciplinary approach, the volume presents some studies on citizenship, moving across political science, case-law and social sciences. The aim of the volume is to reconstruct the debate, with references to empirical cases, and, on the basis of conceptual analysis, to enable a discussion on the main models of citizenship and on the different forms they have taken on in history. The suggested functional theory provides a tool to establish whether the attribution of the said status is justified or not